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results in lower equilibrium effort and lower innovation quality. We conduct a con-
trolled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the
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1 Introduction
Innovation contests play an increasingly important role in research and development ap-
plications ranging from algorithmic design problems, to graphic design and marketing, to
scientific breakthroughs. For example, in 2009, Netflix ran a crowd-sourcing contest, the
Netflix Prize, with a $1 million reward and the objective to “substantially improve the accu-
racy of predictions about how much someone is going to enjoy a movie based on their movie
preferences.” One key feature of this contest was a real-time leaderboard that provided in-
formation regarding performance of the top submitted algorithms. Since then, leaderboards
have become a common feature of crowd-sourcing contests (e.g., Kaggle.com, drivendata.org,
challenge.gov). However, the extent to which leaderboards contribute to innovation quality
and innovation effort is not well understood.
In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally examine sequential-search innovation
competition with a public leaderboard and a fixed ending date (i.e. finite horizon) and
compare it to innovation competition with private performance feedback. In each period of
the innovation contest, participants have the opportunity to engage in a costly innovation
search. The search yields –a priori uncertain– innovation quality. We refer to the maximum
of the innovation qualities among all of the opportunities that she has developed in previous
periods as the score. At the fixed end of the contest, the participant with the highest
score wins a prize. In this context, our focus is on the effects of information disclosure in
the form of a public leaderboard on effort provision and innovation quality. We provide
new results on the characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium for searched-based
innovation competition with public-leaderboard feedback, and compare that to the case of
private performance feedback without a leaderboard as characterized by Taylor (1995). We
then use a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions on effort
provision and innovation quality with and without public leaderboard feedback.
In our sequential-search environment, information disclosure in the form of public leader-
board feedback generates incentives that are reminiscent of the dollar auction and the penny
auction.1 The dollar auction is a dynamic ascending-price auction with public feedback of
the highest standing bid (i.e. a leaderboard) and the following features: (i) the auction opens
with a standing bid of zero, (ii) the standing bid may only be increased by a fixed bid incre-
ment (iii) bidding continues until no bidder is willing to increase the standing bid (by the
fixed bid increment), (iv) the highest bidder wins the item up for auction, and (v) both the
highest and the second highest bidders pay their bids. Escalation arises in this setting be-
cause the losing bidder would always be better off if she incrementally increased the standing
bid and won the auction. Our sequential-search contest with public leaderboard feedback
presents a similar opportunity for escalation. In particular, at each stage of the contest, each
1See, for example, Hinnosaar (2016) on the penny auction and Shubik (1971) and O’Neill (1986) on the
dollar auction.
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participant (i) has a sunk research cost, (ii) knows whether he or she is in the lead, and (iii)
the trailing player can try to take the lead by expending an incremental search cost. We show
that, in equilibrium, participants who trail in the competition provide more effort. However,
we also show that, in equilibrium, both participants who are ahead and participants who are
behind strategically reduce their effort as the leader’s existing innovation quality increases.
The main takeaway from our theoretical analysis is that despite the potential for leader-
board feedback to escalate the competition, we find that the presence of a leaderboard
generates both lower equilibrium expected effort and lower equilibrium expected innovation
quality than would be achieved without the leaderboard. The results of our experiment
largely confirm these theoretical predictions. In particular, the experiment consist of two
main treatments of the competition with the leaderboard (leaderboard feedback treatment)
and without the leaderboard (private feedback treatment). We find that the private-feedback
treatment results in more effort and a higher quality of the winning innovation than the
leaderboard-feedback treatment. We also experimentally confirm that current leaders tend
to exert less effort than followers and that both leaders and followers become less willing to
exert effort as the innovation quality increases.
Our paper contributes to several active streams of literature. First, we contribute to
the literature on innovation competitions. The existing approaches include but are not
limited to variations on the all-pay auctions (e.g., Che and Gale, 2003; Chawla, Hartline and
Sivan, 2015), the exponential-bandit contests (e.g., Halac, Kartik and Liu, 2017; Bimpikis,
Ehsani and Mostagir, 2019), two-stage difference-form contests (e.g., Aoyagi, 2010; Klein
and Schmutzler, 2017; Goltsman and Mukherjee, 2011; Gershkov and Perry, 2009; Yildirim,
2005), crowdsourcing contests (e.g,. Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; DiPalantino and Vojnovic, 2009;
Erat and Krishnan, 2012; Ales, Cho and Körpeoğlu, 2017), and dynamic contests (e.g., Lang,
Seel and Strack, 2014; Seel and Strack, 2016). In terms of studies that focus on feedback in
contests, our work is closely related to Mihm and Schlapp (2018) who examine a two-period
contest with leaderboard feedback, private feedback, and no feedback. The authors show
that the level of uncertainty may interact with the designer’s objective (i.e., average effort or
best performance) and lead to feedback being optimal for some combination(s) of uncertainty
and objective. Regarding models on search-based innovation competitions, our work is most
closely related to Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Baye and Hoppe (2003).
In particular, although the existing literature on search-based innovation competition has
considered the case of private feedback, our study is the first (to our knowledge) to provide
equilibrium predictions for dynamic contests with the leaderboard feedback in a finite-horizon
setting.
Second, we contribute to the experimental literature on feedback in contests. Relevant
recent experimental work shows that feedback may not always be desired include Kuhnen
and Tymula (2012), Ludwig and Lünser (2012), and Deck and Kimbrough (2017). Deck
and Kimbrough (2017) experimentally confirm that in Halac, Kartik and Liu (2017) setting,
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withholding information leads to better innovation outcomes. This result arises from the
fact that the information that your opponents have not procured the zero-one innovation
lowers your own belief about the probability that innovation is possible. That is, information
may be discouraging and, thus, hiding information may be valuable. In the dynamic effort
provision setting in which there is range of possible outcomes Kuhnen and Tymula (2012)
and Ludwig and Lünser (2012) find that feedback influences the dynamics of effort provision
but not total effort. Our experimental results are consistent with some of the findings on
the dynamics of effort provision observed in these papers. In particular, we find that leaders
tend to reduce their effort, whereas followers tend to increase their effort. It is important
to note, however, that these findings are not generalizable to all contest settings. In fact, in
a recent survey, Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta (2015) highlight that in some cases
feedback may result in the trailing player dropping out (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2011).
Finally, our work is related to the literature on factors that motivate individuals to
innovate. In particular, on the experimental side, recent studies have examined the role of
incentives (Ederer and Manso, 2013), preferences (Herz, Schunk and Zehnder, 2014; Rosokha
and Younge, 2017), and biases (Herz, Schunk and Zehnder, 2014). On the empirical side, two
recent surveys by Astebro et al. (2014) and Koudstaal, Sloof and Van Praag (2015) highlight
that entrepreneurs are typically less risk and loss averse. In the current paper, we consider
the extent to which risk aversion, loss aversion, and sunk-cost fallacy play a role in a search-
based innovation competition.2 Specifically, as part of our experiment, we elicited those
three measures with incentivized multiple-price list tasks. In addition, we asked subjects to
complete several unincentivized personality questionnaires. We find that risk aversion is a
significant predictor of the number of costly innovation actions in the contest, with more
risk-averse subjects taking fewer actions. However, we did not find that loss aversion, sunk-
cost fallacy, or unincentivized measures of personality were predictive of subjects’ behavior
in the contest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the theoretical
model. In section 3, we provide details of the experimental design. In section 4, we develop
predictions for our environment and organize them into four hypotheses. In section 5, we
present main results of the experiment. Finally, in section 6, we conclude.
2We focus on risk aversion and loss aversion as characteristics that have been documented to matter in
the lab (e.g., Herz, Schunk and Zehnder, 2014; Rosokha and Younge, 2017) and field (Astebro et al., 2014;
Koudstaal, Sloof and Van Praag, 2015) settings. In addition, we consider the sunk-cost fallacy because it has
been shown to affect behavior in a related setting of penny auctions (Augenblick, 2015). Penny auctions are
auctions in which agents pay to bid and the value of the item decreases after each bid. Augenblick (2015)
shows theoretically how the sunk cost fallacy can lead to auctioneers making profit and finds empirical
support for the sunk-cost fallacy in online penny auction data. Although our environment shares elements
similar to the penny auction, we do not find evidence of the sunk-cost fallacy.
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2 Theory
Consider a two-player T -period dynamic innovation contest, along the lines of Taylor (1995).
In this model, innovation activity takes the form of a search process with perfect recall. In
each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, each player i ∈ {1, 2} has the opportunity to exert effort at a cost
of c > 0. If player i exerts effort, she obtains an innovation, with quality level si,t, a random
variable that is distributed according to F , where F has a continuous and strictly positive
density everywhere on its support, which is assumed to be a convex subset of R+ with a
lower bound of 0.3 In the event that player i does not exert effort in period t, let si,t = 0.
Player i’s innovation “score” at the end of period t is denoted by si,t ≡ max{si,1, . . . , si,t}.
After T periods, the contest ends and the player with the higher innovation score at the end
of period T , that is, the player i with si,T = max{s1,T , s2,T}, is awarded a prize with value
v ≥ 2c.4 In the case of a tie, the winner is randomly chosen.
We examine two levels of feedback in the dynamic-innovation contest: (i) private feedback
and (ii) leaderboard feedback. With the private-feedback innovation contest, at the beginning
of each period t, each player i knows her current score (si,t−1) and at the end of period
t, player i observes her period t innovation quality si,t. With the leaderboard-feedback
innovation contest, at the beginning of each period t, each player i knows, in addition to her
own private feedback, the current max score,5 max{s1,t−1, s2,t−1}. In the following subsection,
we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium for the public-feedback innovation contest.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the convention, due to Taylor (1995), of referring
to each draw of an innovation quality si,t as a new innovation. Note, however, that an
equivalent interpretation is that player i is working on one specific innovation and that each
draw of an innovation quality si,t is in regards to searching over quality improvements to
that particular innovation. Depending on the application, this second interpretation may be
more natural.
2.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Innovation Contests
Private Feedback
The subgame perfect equilibrium for the private-feedback innovation contest is characterized
by Taylor (1995). In particular, Proposition 2 of that paper establishes that the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium takes the form of a stopping rule in which each player i continues
3In the experiment, we assume that innovations are exponentially distributed (F (x;λ) = 1 − e−λx and
f(x;λ) = λe−λx, where λ > 0 is the rate parameter).
4Our analysis can be extended to the case of v ∈ [c, 2c), but for the sake of brevity, we focus here on the
case in which v ≥ 2c.
5Note that the game in which, at the beginning of each period, each player observes both of the players’
current scores is theoretically equivalent to the game in which, at the beginning of each period, each player
observes her own score and the maximum of the players’ scores.
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to exert effort until her max score hits a threshold – denoted by ξi – and she stops exerting
effort.
Figure 1: Period T Local Best Response for Private Feedback
Best-Response
1
𝐹(𝑠𝑇)
1 𝑝′𝑇
𝐷 (𝑝𝑇 = 1)
𝑁𝐷 (𝑝𝑇 = 0)
0
𝐹(𝜉)
Notes: sT – own score in period T; F (.) – distribution of innovation quality; p′T –
probability that the other player draws in period T ; ND(pT = 0) – decision not to draw;
D(pT = 1) – decision to draw; ξ – threshold determined by equation (1).
The equilibrium value of the threshold ξi is determined by the equation
v
∫ ∞
ξi
(1− F T (ξi))F (x)− F (ξi)
1− F (ξi) dF (x)− c = 0. (1)
For example, in our experiment, we assume that when a player exerts effort in a given period
the quality of the innovation in that period is a random variable that is distributed according
to F (x;λ) = 1 − e−λx with λ = 0.125, which implies that for T = 10, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium stopping rule has a threshold of ξ = 12.16.
Leaderboard Feedback
In Appendix A, we characterize the SPNE in the leaderboard-feedback innovation contest
for the case of a general utility function that may allow for risk aversion, loss aversion, and
sunk-cost fallacy considerations to be modeled. For simplicity, we focus, here, on the case of
risk neutral players. Let ft (lt) denote the follower (leader) in an arbitrary period t. We begin
by characterizing the final-stage local equilibrium strategies and corresponding equilibrium
expected payoffs, and then make our way back through the game tree. In the final period T ,
if the max score at the beginning of period T is sT , then we have the following matrix game:
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Table 1: Period T Local Subgame
fT (follower)
D ND
lT (leader)
D v(1+F (sT )
2)
2 − c, v(1−F (sT )
2)
2 − c v − c, 0
ND vF (sT ), v(1− F (sT ))− c v, 0
From Table 1, we see that the period T follower’s (fT ’s) final-stage local expected payoff
from choosing to draw (D) when the period T leader (lT ) chooses not to draw (ND) is
v(1 − F (sT )) − c. Similarly, fT ’s expected payoff from choosing D when lT chooses D is
vF (sT )(1 − F (sT )) + v(1−F (sT ))22 − c = v(1−F (sT )
2)
2
− c. Regardless of lT ’s period T action,
the payoff to fT from choosing ND in period T is 0. The expected payoffs for the period T
leader (lT ) follow along similar lines.
To calculate the final-stage local equilibrium, let plT (pfT ) denote the probability that the
period T leader lT (period T follower fT ) draws in period T . Figure 2 presents the players’
best-response correspondences as a function of the leader’s max score at the beginning of
period-T , sT , and of the probability that the opponent draws in period T and receives a
stochastic period-T innovation quality distributed according to F (·).
Figure 2: Period T Local Best Responses for Leaderboard Feedback
Leader’s Best-Response Follower’s Best-Response
1 − 2𝑐𝑐
𝑣𝑣
1 − 2𝑐𝑐
𝑣𝑣
1
𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇)
1 − 𝑐𝑐
𝑣𝑣
12𝑐𝑐
𝑣𝑣
1
𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇)
1𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇
𝐷𝐷 (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 = 1)
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 (𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 = 0) 𝐷𝐷 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇 = 1)
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇 = 0)
0 0
Notes: sT – score in period T; F (.) – distribution of innovation quality; pfT – probability
that follower draws in period T ; plT – probability that the leader draws in period T ;
ND(piT = 0) – decision not to draw by player i ∈ {leader, follower}; D(piT = 1) –
decision to draw by player i ∈ {leader, follower};
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Proposition 1 characterizes the final-stage local equilibrium strategies and expected pay-
offs that follow directly from the best-response correspondences given in Figure 2. In partic-
ular, if 1−
√
2c
v
≥ F (sT ) and pft = 1 then we see from the Leader’s Best-Response panel of
Figure 2 that the leader’s best response is D(plT = 1). Similarly, if 1 −
√
2c
v
≥ F (sT ) then
we see from the Follower’s Best-Response panel of Figure 2 that for any value of pft ∈ [0, 1]
the follower’s best response is D(pfT = 1). The remaining cases of values of F (sT ) follow
along similar lines.
Proposition 1. The final-stage local equilibrium strategies are characterized as follows:
Both draw if 1−
√
2c
v
≥ F (sT )
only follower draws if 1− c
v
≥ F (sT ) > 1−
√
2c
v
neither draws if F (sT ) > 1− cv
.
The corresponding final-stage local equilibrium expected payoffs for the leader and follower
are given in Figure 1.
To calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, we may take the Proposition 1
final-stage local expected payoffs and work back through the game tree to stage T − 1. The
only (computational) issue in continuing the backward induction process all the way to the
root of the game in stage 1 is the calculation of the expected continuation payoffs in the
period t local subgame. We provide details on these calculations in Appendix A.
3 Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the experimental design and provide predictions for our experi-
ment using the theory developed above. In particular, the primary goal of the experiment is
to address the role of feedback in sequential-search innovation competition. To this end, the
main part of our experiment consists of two within-subject treatments: (i) a public feedback
treatment and (ii) a leaderboard feedback treatment. In addition to the primary goal, our
aim is to better understand factors that may influence individuals to innovate. To this end,
our design includes an individual search task that removes the strategic aspect present in the
two competitions and the elicitation of individual (e.g., risk aversion) and personality (e.g.,
grit) characteristics that may be important in an innovation setting. Next, we elaborate on
details of the design and our implementation of the experiment.
3.1 Private-Feedback and Leaderboard-Feedback Contests
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject individually reads instructions that are
displayed on their computer screen. In particular, we implemented a within-subject design,
7
whereby each subject starts the experiment with either eight private-feedback contests or
eight leaderboard-feedback contests and then switches to the other feedback type for contests
9 through 16. Thus, before contests 1 and 9, subjects are provided with detailed instructions
and practice tasks that explain the setting of the upcoming eight contests. During the
practice tasks, subjects were matched with a computer that made decisions randomly, and
subjects were informed about the random behavior of the opponent in the practice task.
A copy of the instructions used in the experiment and the practice tasks is provided in
Appendix C.
Each contest consists of two subjects matched for 10 periods of decision-making. Prior
to the first period, each subject is given an endowment of $10.00. Within each period,
subjects have the opportunity to pay a cost c = $1.00 to draw an innovation quality from
an exponential distribution with parameter λ = 0.125. At the end of 10 periods, the contest
ends and the subject with the highest-quality innovation (the highest score) wins the prize of
v = $10.00. Each subject keeps any money left over from her endowment. These parameters
were chosen to simplify the environment and were the same for the private and leaderboard
treatments as well as for the individual search task described in section 3.2.
The first treatment is a two-player pravate-feedback contest in which each subject only
receives feedback on their own innovations. Specifically, in each period, subjects decide
whether to innovate. Although subjects know the quality of their own innovation, they
do not know whether they are winning or losing until all decision periods are over. That
is, the winning innovation is revealed only at the end of the contest. A screenshot of the
private-feedback treatment is presented in Figure 3(a). In particular, during each period,
each subject has access to the number of times she has drawn, the quality of each of the past
innovations she has drawn, and her current innovation score (her innovation with the highest
quality). To simplify decision-making, subjects are told the probability that an additional
draw will result in a higher individual innovation score. At the end of the contest, subjects
are informed of the winner of the contest and the amount of money they have earned for the
contest.
The second treatment is a two-player leaderboard-feedback contest in which each subject
receives feedback on hew own innovation as well as the innovation that is currently lead-
ing the contest. Specifically, similar to the private-feedback contest, in each period of the
leaderboard-feedback contest, subjects decide whether to innovate; however, the contest’s
best innovation is now revealed at the start of each period. Thus, each participant knows
whether she is a leader or a follower. A screenshot of the leaderboard-feedback treatment is
presented in Figure 3(b). Although most aspects of the leaderboard-feedback treatment are
the same as in the private-feedback treatment, subjects receive additional feedback regarding
the current highest score in the contest. That is, subjects always know whether they are
currently winning or losing the contest and the probability that their next draw will result
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in their score being higher than the current maximum score.6
Figure 3: Screenshots of the Experimental Interface
(a) Private Feedback
(b) Leaderboard Feedback
3.2 Individual Tasks and Questionnaires
After completing both treatments, subjects were presented with several individual tasks. In
particular, subjects completed three elicitation tasks: (i) a risk-aversion task, (ii) a loss-
aversion task, and (iii) a sunk-cost-fallacy task. In each of these three tasks, subjects chose
one of two options for each of the 20 decisions. The decisions were organized into a multiple
6Subjects are no longer shown the probability that an additional draw will result in a higher individual
innovation score.
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price list as is common in the literature (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; Rubin, Samek and
Sheremeta, 2018). In particular, the first task was the risk-aversion task. In this task each
participant chose between a risky option (50% chance of $10.00 and a 50% percent chance of
$0.00) and a safe option that was varied across decisions (started at $0.50 and increased by
$0.50 in each subsequent decision). The second task was the loss-aversion task. In this task
each participant chose between a safe option of $0.00 and a risky option had a 50% chance
at $0.00 and a 50% chance of a loss (varied from −$0.50 to −$10.00 in increments of $0.50).
The third elicitation task was the sunk-cost-fallacy task. In this task, subjects were given
an endowment of $15.00 and were required to pay $5.00 to initiate a project. Each subject
then decided whether to complete the project at various completion costs. Completing the
project was always worth $7.50; however, the cost varied between decisions. The completion
cost started at $0.50 and increased by $0.50 in each subsequent decision. The sunk-cost
fallacy occurs if the subject completes the project at a cost greater than $7.50. Screenshots
of the three individual elicitation tasks are presented in Figures D1-D3 in the Appendix.
In addition to the above elicitation tasks, each subject participated in eight individual
search tasks. The individual search tasks were similar to the two contests except that the
human opponent was replaced with an existing innovation of a known quality. In particular,
the existing innovation took on five values: 15.177, 16.832, 18.421, 20.205, and 23.966.7 Each
subject saw all five values and the values 15.177, 18.421, and 23.966 were repeated twice.
The five values were displayed in random order. If the subject ends the period with an
innovation of greater quality than the existing innovation, she won $10.00. Thus, these tasks
allow us to analyze individual behavior in a similar environment but without competition
against another human subject. A screenshot of the individual search task is presented in
Figure D4 in the Appendix.
The experiment concluded with three unincentivized personality questionnaires. In par-
ticular, the first questionnaire measured the psychological construct of grit through the
12-item Grit Scale (Duckworth et al., 2007). The second questionnaire measured the big five
characteristics (agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness)
through the 44-item big-five inventory (John and Srivastava, 1999). The third question-
naire measured achievement-striving and competitiveness through the 10- and 6-item scales
obtained from the International Personality Item Pool.8
3.3 Experimental Administration
All parts of the experiment, including instructions, innovation contests, individual elicita-
tion tasks, and personality questionnaires, were implemented in oTree (Chen, Schonger and
7These values correspond to 85, 88, 90, 92, and 95 percentiles of the exponential distribution, respectively.
In particular, the risk-neutral agent would be indifferent between drawing and not drawing if the existing
innovation was 18.421.
8https://ipip.ori.org/
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Wickens, 2016). In total, subjects participated in 27 compensation-relevant tasks. Specifi-
cally, the compensation-relevant tasks included the eight private-feedback contests, the eight
leaderboard-feedback contests, the risk-aversion elicitation task, the loss-aversion elicitation
task, the sunk-cost-elicitation task, and the eight individual search tasks. At the end of the
experiment, two of these 27 tasks were chosen at random by the computer for payment.
In total, 96 students were recruited on the campus of Purdue University using ORSEE
software (Greiner, 2015). Participants were split into 12 sessions, with eight participants per
session. As mentioned above, to ensure that the order of treatments did not affect the main
results, half of the sessions started out with eight private-feedback contests, while the other
half of the sessions started out with eight leaderboard-feedback contests. The experimental
lasted under 60 minutes, with average earnings of $19.91.
4 Predictions
In this section, we present predictions for the experiment that were obtained by computa-
tionally solving for the sequential equilibrium described in section 2. In particular, using
the model, 1 million contests were simulated and the resulting predictions were organized
into four hypotheses: the first hypothesis pertains to the comparison of the private- and
leaderboard-feedback contests; the second hypothesis pertains to the comparison of leader
and follower behavior; the third hypothesis pertains to the dynamics of the draws in the two
contests; and the fourth hypothesis pertains to the role of individual characteristics such as
risk aversion, loss aversion, and the sunk-cost fallacy.9
9One million contests were simulated for each value of each bias parameter.
11
Table 2: Summary of Predictions
Private Feedback Leaderboard Feedback
Winning Innovation 23.42 21.84
Aggregate Draws 8.36 6.34
Proportion of Draws
Leader
Known Score 0–15 0.67/0.30/0.03 0.59/0.04/0.00
Known Score 15–25 0.11/0.02/0.00 0.00/0.00/0.00
Follower
Known Score 0–15 0.90/0.62/0.37 0.59/0.55/1.00
Known Score 15–25 0.58/0.19/0.08 0.14/0.38/0.32
Notes: Aggregate draws refers to the predicted number of draws that occurs in a contest
in each treatment. Winning innovation refers to the predicted quality of the winning
innovation in each treatment. Known score refers to the individual score in the private-
feedback treatment and the maximum score in the leaderboard-feedback treatment. The
third row displays the draw rate of the leader and the follower in periods 2, 6, and 10
of the experiment. The fourth row displays the draw rate in periods 2, 6, and 10 of the
experiment for known scores in the 20th-80th percentiles for that period. The fifth row
displays the difference in draw rates for known scores in the lower half and the upper
half of the known score distribution for periods 2, 6, and 10.
The top part of Table 2 shows that a contest with private feedback is predicted to induce
more draws (8.36) and result in a greater winning innovation score (23.42) than a contest
with leaderboard feedback (6.34 draws; winning innovation of 21.84). We summarize this
prediction with Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1. The private-feedback contest leads to more draws and a higher winning in-
novation than the leaderboard-feedback contest.
The bottom part of Table 2 presents the proportion of draws broken down by the period
of the contest (presented as a triple of 2nd/6th/10th period), the current score (grouped into
ranges 0–15 and 15–25), and whether the player was a leader or a follower.10 By comparing
the proportion of draws between leaders and followers, the follower is clearly predicted to
be at least as likely to draw as the leader across most of the ranges of innovation scores and
periods.11 We summarize this prediction with Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2. Followers draw more frequently than leaders.
The bottom part of Table 2 also provides an insight regarding the dynamics of decision-
making. In the private-feedback treatment, as the individual innovation score increases,
10Figures D6 and D7 in Appendix D present further evidence on the proportion of draws obtained from
our computational model using simulations.
11Overall, leaders draw 8.73% of the time in the simulated contests and followers draw 39.20% of the time
in the simulated contests.
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each player becomes less willing to draw. This can be seen by comparing the proportion of
draws between relatively low individual scores (0–15) and relatively high individual scores
(15–25) for both leaders and followers. Additionally, in the leaderboard-feedback treatment,
as the maximum score increases, each player becomes less willing to draw. This can be seen
by comparing the proportion of draws between relatively low maximum scores (0–15) and
relatively high maximum scores (15–25) for both leaders and followers. We summarize this
prediction with Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3. Players become less willing to draw as their individual score increases in the
private-feedback treatment and as the maximum score increases in the leaderboard-feedback
treatment.
Lastly, we incorporate three behavioral characteristics: risk aversion, loss aversion, and
the sunk-cost fallacy.12 The three panels of Figure 4 present the comparative statics as we
vary these characteristics one at a time. For example, to vary risk aversion, we model both
players as having a CRRA utility function with parameter γ, and we vary this parameter
across a range of values typically observed in the experimental literature.
Figure 4: Decision to Draw and Comparative Statics
Notes: This figure displays equilibrium predictions under different levels of (a) risk aver-
sion, (b) sunk cost fallacy, and (c) loss aversion. The orange line is the private-feedback
treatment, while the blue line is the leaderboard-feedback treatment.
Figure 4 shows that as risk aversion and loss aversion increase, the number of total draws
made in the contest decreases. The sunk-cost fallacy, however, has an opposite effect. In
particular, as the sunk-cost fallacy increases, we observe more total draws. We summarize
these predictions with Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4. The number of draws increases with (a) a decrease in risk aversion, (b) a
decrease in loss aversion, (c) an increase in sunk-cost fallacy.
12Specifications of the three utility functions as well as the general procedure for obtaining predictions
are provided in Appendix B.
13
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiment. In particular, first, in section 5.1 we
compare the outcomes of the private and leaderboard treatments. Next, in section 5.2, we
test for differences in behavior between the leader and the follower. Then, in section 5.3 we
consider the dynamics observed in the experimental data. Finally, in section 5.4, we discuss
the role of individual characteristics in determining innovation-contest outcomes.
5.1 Private vs Leaderboard Contests
The columns of Table 3 display the summary statistics from the two treatments. In partic-
ular, the table is divided down into two parts. In the top part, we present the aggregate
results on the final innovation quality and the total number of draws that we observed in
each of the treatments, on average. In the bottom part, we present the results on the pro-
portion of draws conditional on the period in the game (periods 2, 6, and 10 are separated
by "/"), current score (we group scores into two ranges 0–15 and 15–25), and whether the
decision-maker was a leader or a follower.13
Table 3: Contest Results
Private Feedback Leaderboard Feedback
Winning Innovation 22.87 21.47
Aggregate Draws 8.50 7.54
Proportion of Draws
Leader
Known Score 0–15 0.59/0.60/0.33 0.37/0.36/0.20
Known Score 15–25 0.16/0.16/0.11 0.08/0.08/0.07
Follower
Known Score 0–15 0.61/0.64/0.40 0.60/0.59/0.63
Known Score 15–25 0.45/0.41/0.38 0.49/0.50/0.49
Notes: Aggregate draws refers to the predicted number of draws that occurs in a contest
in each treatment. Winning innovation refers to the predicted quality of the winning
innovation in each treatment. The third row displays the draw rate of the leader and the
follower in periods 2, 6, and 10 of the experiment. The fourth row displays the draw rate
in periods 2, 6, and 10 of the experiment for scores that range in the 20th-80th percentile
for that period. The fifth row displays the difference in draw rates for scores in the lower
half and the upper half of the score distribution for periods 2, 6, and 10. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The top part of Table 3 shows the average number of contest draws and the average value
of the winning innovation in each treatment. In particular, in the private-feedback treatment,
13Recall that while the role of leader/follower is known to the decision-making in the leaderboard treat-
ment, it is not known to the decision-makers in the private feedback.
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the average number of draws (8.50) and the average value of the winning innovation (22.87)
are not significantly different from the theoretically predicted values (8.36 draws, p-value
0.67; score of 23.42, p-value 0.36).14 In terms of the leaderboard feedback, we also find
no difference in the value of the winning innovation between theory and the experiment
(21.84 vs. 21.47, p-value 0.42). However, we do find a difference between theory and the
experiment in terms of the number of draws for the leaderboard-feedback treatment (6.34
vs. 7.54, p-value 0.000).
The main focus of the aggregate results is on the comparison between private and leader-
board feedback (i.e., Hypothesis 1). Table 3 shows that in our experiment, the number of
draws in the private-feedback contest (8.50) is greater than in the leaderboard-feedback con-
test (7.54). We test whether this difference is significant using a random-effects regression
with session-level effects. We find that this difference is significant (p-value=0.000). Sim-
ilarly, Table 3 shows that the winning technology is greater in a private-feedback contest
(22.87) than a leaderboard-feedback contest (21.47). Again, using a random-effects regres-
sion with session-level effects, we find that this difference is significant (p-value=0.029). We
summarize these tests with Result 1.
Result 1. A private-feedback contest results in more draws and a greater winning innovation
value than a leaderboard-feedback contest (evidence supporting Hypothesis 1).
5.2 Leaders vs. Followers
The bottom part of Table 3 shows that the proportion of time that a follower draws is greater
than the proportion of time that a leader draws. While the difference is observed in both
the private and leaderboard treatments, the difference is much larger in the latter. Figure
5 presents further evidence regarding this comparison. Formally, each panel of the figure
shows a panel data logistic regression of the decision to draw on the maximum score. The
bottom row of the figure presents the comparison of of the leader’s decision (blue) and the
follower’s decision (red). The figure clearly shows that in almost every combination of period
and maximum score, followers are more likely to draw than leaders. Thus, Figure 5 suggests
that Hypothesis 2 holds.15
14Hypothesis tests in this subsection are conducted using bootstrapped regressions, with 5,000 bootstrap
samples, on the session-level averages.
15Figure B5 provide similar figures for the remaining periods.
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Figure 5: Decision to Draw in the Leaderboard-Feedback Treatment
Notes: This figure displays two sets of graphs. The first set of graphs display logistic
regressions of the decision to draw in the pravate-feedback treatment for periods 2, 6, and
10. The second set of graphs display logistic regressions of the leader’s decision (blue) to
draw and the follower’s decision (red) to draw in the leaderboard-feedback treatment for
periods 2, 6, and 10.
To formally test the difference between leader and follower behavior, we use a panel data
logistic regression. In particular, we regress the decision to draw on an indicator variable
for whether the subject was a leader, while accounting for subject-level random effects and
clustering standard errors at the session level.16 The coefficient on the leader variable is
negative and significant at the 1% level. We summarize these observations with Result 2.
Result 2. Leaders draw less frequently than followers in the leaderboard-feedback treatment
(evidence supporting Hypothesis 2).
5.3 Dynamics of Decision Making
Figure 5 suggests that subjects are less willing to draw as the individual score increases
in the private-feedback treatment and as the maximum score increases in the leaderboard-
feedback treatment. To formally test Hypothesis 3, we run panel data logisitic regressions,
with subject-level random effects and session-level clustered standard errors, of the decision to
16Note that the regression is run on the observations where the score is greater than zero (and thus there
is a leader and a follower).
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draw on the individual score. We run these regressions for the last nine periods of the private-
feedback treatment. We find that in each of the regressions, the coefficient on the individual
score is negative and significant at the 1% level. Additionally, we run similar regressions for
the leaderboard-feedback treatment with the difference being that the decision to draw is
regressed on the maximum score. Again, for each of the regressions, the coefficient on the
maximum score is negative and significant at the 1% level. We summarize these results with
Result 3.
Result 3. Subjects are less willing to draw as their individual score increases in the private-
feedback treatment and as the maximum score increases in the leaderboard-feedback treatment
(evidence supporting Hypothesis 3).
5.4 Role of Individual Characteristics
In our experiment, subjects completed various elicitation tasks. We used these tasks to shed
light on factors that may influence subjects’ decision to draw. Table 4 displays three sets of
regressions that analyze the decision to draw on the elicited characteristics.17 In particular,
the regressions are carried out using a panel data logistic regression with subject-level random
effects, and standard errors are obtained by clustering at the session level.
Table 4 shows that the regression analyses yield results consistent with our prior analysis
in terms of the role of the treatments and leader/follower behavior. In terms of elicited
individual characteristics, we find that risk aversion has a significantly negative effect across
a number of specifications. At the same time, we find that our measures of loss aversion and
sunk-cost fallacy are not significant in any of the specifications. We summarize these results
with Result 4.
Result 4. Risk aversion leads to a lower likelihood of drawing an innovation (evidence
supporting Hypothesis 4a).
Recall that in addition to the incentivized elicitation of risk aversion, loss aversion, and
the sunk-cost fallacy, we conducted a number of non-incentivized personality questionnaires
that addressed personality characteristics. In particular, in addition to a broad questionnaire
(i.e., Big 5), we selected a few characteristics as potentially important to behavior in an
innovation-contest setting (i.e., Grit and Competitiveness). Table 4 shows that virtually
no personality characteristics are significant in explaining drawing behavior for any of the
regression specifications.18
17We relegate regressions on the individual search task to the appendix as the results are similar to the
results found in Table 4.
18Table D1 in the Appendix provides an alternative specification of this regression in which we first carry
out factor analysis to identify orthogonal factors present in the questionnaire. The regression results stay
largely the same.
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Table 4: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var.: Pooled Private Leaderboard
Draw Decision All Leader Follower All Leader Follower
L-Board -0.70*** — — — — — —
(0.20) — — — — — —
Priv. x Score -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.18*** — — —
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) — — —
L-Board x MaxScore -0.11*** — — — -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.11***
(0.01) — — — (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Period -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.24*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Risk Aversion -1.13∗∗ -1.41** -1.50 -1.20** -1.05** -1.01 -0.31
(0.50) (0.72) (1.32) (0.56) (0.46) (0.87) (1.15)
Loss Aversion -0.22 -0.10 1.15 -0.83 -0.30 -1.12 -0.43
(0.65) (0.83) (1.01) (0.70) (0.63) (1.09) (0.89)
Sunk Cost Fallacy 0.06 0.14 -1.07 0.25 -0.12 -0.55 0.02
(0.61) (0.94) (0.87) (0.96) (0.45) (0.87) (0.94)
Grit -0.15 -0.28 -0.53 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17 -0.20
(0.24) (0.39) (0.47) (0.33) (0.16) (0.40) (0.47)
Competitiveness -0.18 0.12 0.00 0.42 -0.43 -0.07 -0.27
(0.31) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42) (0.28) (0.38) (0.36)
Achievement Striving 0.38 0.18 0.06 -0.18 0.57 0.66 0.08
(0.39) (0.54) (0.68) (0.49) (0.36) (0.46) (0.70)
Extraversion 0.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.21 0.13
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.13)
Agreeableness 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.27 0.20 0.26
(0.22) (0.28) (0.35) (0.29) (0.22) (0.32) (0.33)
Neuroticism 0.06 0.07 -0.14 0.12 0.04 0.13 -0.08
(0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) 0.26
Openness -0.18 -0.18 -0.27 -0.25 -0.23 -0.46 -0.23
(0.17) (0.26) (0.33) (0.25) (0.15) (0.33) (0.26)
Conscientiousness 0.04 0.30 0.43 0.10 -0.24 -0.34 -0.41
(0.28) (0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.17) (0.60) (0.34)
Constant 0.83 0.91 5.38** 1.03 0.58 2.62** 4.24*
(1.44) (2.00) (2.46) (1.95) (1.26) (1.13) (2.46)
Observations 15,360 7,680 3,451 3,451 7,680 3,411 3,411
Notes: The regression pools the data from the individual search tasks, the private-
feedback treatment, and the leaderboard-feedback treatment. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote sig-
nificance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of leaderboard feedback in sequential-search innovation
competition. In particular, our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the existing
theoretical literature by developing a model of dynamic scoring contests with a finite horizon
and perfect recall. Our work is the first (to our knowledge) to formally provide an equilib-
rium prediction for the environment with leaderboard feedback. Specifically, we show that
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leaderboard feedback may result in lower effort as captured by the number of costly innova-
tion decisions, which in turn yields worse innovation quality of the innovation competition
than providing private feedback.
Second, we contribute to the experimental literature that investigates contest and inno-
vation competitions. Our experiment yields several results that support theory. Specifically,
we find that for a two-player finite-horizon contest, leaderboard feedback yields less effort
and lower innovation quality than private feedback. We also find that the internal dynamics
present in the data are consistent with the model. In particular, when feedback is provided,
leaders of the contest reduce their effort, whereas followers do not. In addition, as the qual-
ity of innovation increases, agents become less likely to invest resources to generate a new
innovation.
Finally, our work also contributes to a stream of literature that studies the role of indi-
vidual characteristics in determining an individual’s propensity to innovate. In particular,
we elicit three individual characteristics that have been shown to be important in the inno-
vation and contest setting: risk aversion, loss aversion, and the sunk-cost fallacy. We find
that among these individual characteristics, risk aversion stands out as being an important
driver of behavior in our experiment. At the same time, loss aversion and sunk cost fallacy
are not significant in explaining the data. In addition, we find no evidence that personality
characteristics are predictive of behavior in the dynamic contests studied in this paper.
Our work has several shortcomings that open interesting avenues for future research.
First, our theoretical model and laboratory experiment investigate a finite-horizon innovation
competition. Comparing it to the an infinite-horizon setting would be interesting. Second,
we considered a two-player contest, the extent to which these results translate to a setting
with more than two players is not known. Finally, subjects in our experiment participated
in the contest (although they had an option not to draw). Investigating the extent to which
our results hold if subjects could select to withdraw from the contests entirely would be
interesting.
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Appendices
A SPNE for Finite-horizon Leaderboard-Feedback Inno-
vation Contest
In this appendix, we describe the process for characterizing the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria of the finite horizon leaderboard-feedback innovation contest. Recall that ft (lt) denotes
the follower (leader) in an arbitrary period t. We begin by characterizing the final-stage
local equilibrium strategies and corresponding equilibrium expected payoffs, and then make
our way back through the game tree. We assume that: (i) utility is time separable and (ii)
the utility u(·) in each period displays constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), where for
convenience we set u(x) = (1−e−xR)/R for R > 0 and u(x) = x for R = 0. Although our focus
in this appendix is on a utility function that displays risk aversion, it is straightforward to
extend the analysis below to allow for loss aversion and sunk-cost fallacy considerations.
Period T
Let plT [pfT ] denote the probability that the period T leader lT [period T follower fT ] draws
in period T , and let pifT (D, plT |sT ) denote the the payoff to the period T follower fT from
drawing in period T given plT and the score sT . In the final period T , if the max score at
the beginning of period T is sT , then the benefit to the period T follower from drawing (i.e.
pfT = 1) when the period T leader does not draw (i.e. plT = 0) is
pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) = (1− F (sT ))u(v − c) + F (sT )u(−c). (2)
Next, the benefit to the period T follower from drawing when the period T leader does draw
is
pifT (D, plT = 1|sT ) =
[
1− [F (sT )]2
2
]
u(v − c) +
[
1 + [F (sT )]
2
2
]
u(−c). (3)
Thus, at the beginning of period T and given any plT ∈ [0, 1], we have that
pifT (D, plT |sT ) = (1− plT )pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) + plTpifT (D, plT = 1|sT ). (4)
For all plT ∈ [0, 1], the payoff to the period T follower from not drawing in period T , denoted
pifT (ND, plT |sT ), is 0.
For the characterization of when player fT is indifferent between drawing and not drawing
as a function of the beginning of period T leader score sT and the leader’s final-stage-local
strategy plT , it will be convenient to refer to the change in player fT ’s payoff in moving
from drawing to not drawing given that either plT = 0 or plT = 1, which we denote by
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∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) and ∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) respectively, where
∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) = pifT (ND, plT = 0|sT )− pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) (5)
and
∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) = pifT (ND, plT = 1|sT )− pifT (D, plT = 1|sT ) (6)
If
pifT (D, plT = 0|sT )
pifT (D, plT = 0|sT )− pifT (D, plT = 1|sT )
∈ [0, 1]
then for
pindifflT =
∆pifT (plT = 0|sT )
∆pifT (plT = 0|sT )−∆pifT (plT = 1|sT )
=
(1− F (sT ))u(v − c) + F (sT )u(−c)
(u(v − c)− u(−c)) 1
2
(1− [F (sT )]2)
(7)
it follows from equation (4) that
pifT (D, p
indiff
lT
|sT ) = pifT (ND, pindifflT |sT ) = 0
and the period T follower is indifferent between drawing and not drawing. Because ∆pifT (plT =
0|sT ) ≤ ∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ), it follows that if ∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) = −pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) >
0, then player fT would have incentive to not draw for all plT ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, if
∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) = −pifT (D, plT = 1|sT ) < 0, then player fT would have incentive to
draw for all plT ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, it follows that for the term pindifflT defined by equation
(7) to take values in the interval [0, 1], it must be the case that ∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) =
−pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) ≤ 0 and ∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) = −pifT (D, plT = 1|sT ) ≥ 0, or equiva-
lently, F (sT ) ∈
[√
u(v−c)+u(−c)
u(v−c)−u(−c) ,
u(v−c)
u(v−c)−u(−c)
]
.19
For the purpose of stating player fT ’s final-stage-local best-response correspondence as a
function of (plT , sT ) ∈ [0, 1]× supp(F ), let
ΣindifffT =
{
sT
∣∣∣∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) ≤ 0 and ∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) ≥ 0}
denote the set of period T beginning scores sT such that pindifflT ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, let
Σ1fT =
{
sT
∣∣∣∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) < 0}
19Note that in the case of risk neutrality, the equation (7) expression for pindifflT becomes p
indiff
lT
=
v(1−F (sT ))−c
v
2 (1−F (sT ))2 which takes values in [0, 1] when F (sT ) ∈
[√
1− 2cv , 1− cv
]
.
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and let
Σ0fT =
{
sT
∣∣∣∆pifT (plT = 0|sT ) > 0}
and note that ΣindifffT , Σ
1
fT
, and Σ0fT form a partition of supp(F ). Player fT ’s final-stage-local
best-response correspondence is given by:
BRfT (plT |sT ) =

pfT = 1 if sT ∈ Σ1fT
or sT ∈ ΣindifffT and plT < pindifflT
pfT ∈ [0, 1] if sT ∈ ΣindifffT and plT = pindifflT
pfT = 0 if sT ∈ Σ0fT
or sT ∈ ΣindifffT and plT > pindifflT
(8)
Moving on to the period T leader’s problem, the payoff to the period T leader from not
drawing when the period T follower draws is
pilT (ND, pfT = 1|sT ) = F (sT )u(v)
verses a payoff of
pilT (D, pfT = 1|sT ) =
[
1 + [F (sT )]
2
2
]
u(v − c) +
[
1− [F (sT )]2
2
]
u(−c).
when both the period T and the period T follower draw. Similarly, the payoff to the period
T leader from not drawing when the period T follower does not draw is
pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT ) = u(v)
verses a payoff of
pilT (D, pfT = 0|sT ) = u(v − c)
from drawing. Thus, the payoff to the period T leader from drawing in period T given any
pfT ∈ [0, 1], denoted pilT (D, pfT |sT ) is
pilT (D, pfT |sT ) = (1− pfT )pilT (D, pfT = 0|sT ) + pfTpilT (D, pfT = 1|sT ) (9)
and the payoff to the period T leader from not drawing in period T , denoted pilT (ND, pfT |sT )
is
pilT (ND, pfT |sT ) = (1− pfT )pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT ) + pfTpilT (ND, pfT = 1|sT ). (10)
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To define pindifffT , we use the expressions ∆pilT (pfT = 0|sT ) and ∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) where
∆pilT (pfT = 0|sT ) = pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT )− pilT (D, pfT = 0|sT ) (11)
and
∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) = pilT (ND, pfT = 1|sT )− pilT (D, pfT = 1|sT ). (12)
It follows from equations (9) and (10), that if
pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT )− pilT (D, pfT = 0|sT )
[pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT )− pilT (D, pfT = 0|sT )]− [pilT (ND, pfT = 1|sT )− pilT (D, pfT = 1|sT )]
∈ [0, 1]
then for
pindifffT =
∆pilT (pfT = 0|sT )
∆pilT (pfT = 0|sT )−∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT )
=
u(v)− u(v − c)
(1− F (sT ))u(v)− (u(v − c)− u(−c)) 12 (1− [F (sT )]2)
(13)
it follows from equations (9) and (10) that
pilT (D, p
indiff
fT
|sT ) = pilT (ND, pindifffT |sT ) = 0
and the period T leader is indifferent between drawing and not drawing.
Next, because ∆pilT (pfT = 0|sT ) ≥ max{0,∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT )}, it follows that if ∆pilT (pfT =
1|sT ) > 0 then for all pf,T ∈ [0, 1] player lT would have incentive to not draw. For the term
pfT defined by equation (13) to take values in the interval (0, 1), it must be the case that
∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) ≤ 0.
In a manner similar to that used above for player fT ’s final-stage-local best-response
correspondence, we let
ΣindifflT =
{
sT
∣∣∣∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) ≤ 0}
denote the set of period T beginning scores sT such that pindifflT ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, let
Σ0lT =
{
sT
∣∣∣∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) > 0}
and note that ΣindifffT and Σ
0
fT
form a partition of supp(F ). Then, the period T leader’s
final-stage local best-response correspondence as a function of (pfT , sT ) ∈ [0, 1] × supp(F )
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may be written as,
BRlT (pfT |sT ) =

plT = 1 if sT ∈ ΣindifflT and pfT > pindifffT
plT ∈ [0, 1] if sT ∈ ΣindifflT and pfT = pindifffT
plT = 0 if sT ∈ Σ0lT
or sT ∈ ΣindifflT and pfT < pindifffT
(14)
Combining the period T follower’s final-stage-local best-response correspondence from
equation (8) with the period T leader’s final-stage-local best-response correspondence from
equation (14), we can now solve for the subgame perfect final-stage-local equilibrium strate-
gies.
First note that because ∆pifT (plT = 1|sT ) ≥ 0 implies that ∆pilT (pfT = 1|sT ) ≥ 0, it
follows that ΣindifflT ∩ ΣindifffT = ∅ and thus, there exists no non-degenerate final-stage-local
equilibrium. Futhermore, note that ΣindifflT ⊂ Σ1fT and that ΣindifffT ⊂ Σ0lT . For final-stage-
local pure-strategy equilibria, we have the following:
Both draw if sT ∈ ΣindifflT ⊂ Σ1fT
only follower draws if sT ∈ Σ0lT ∩ Σ1fT
neither draws if sT ∈ Σ0lT ∩
(
Σ0fT ∪ ΣindifffT
)
Note that there exists an sB,T ∈ [0, 1] such that the set ΣindifflT ⊂ Σ1fT is equivalent to [0, sB,T ].
Similarly, there exists a sN,T ∈ [0, 1] such that the set Σ0lT ∩
(
Σ0fT ∪ ΣindifffT
)
is equivalent to
[sN,T , 1]. The remaining set Σ0lT ∩Σ1fT is equivalent to [sB,T , sN,T ]. At the points where there
exist multiple equilibria (i.e. sB,T and sN,T ) we will make the simplifying assumption that
the player that is indifferent between drawing and not drawing chooses to draw. That is, at
sT = sB,T we focus on the final-stage-local equilibrium in which both player’s draw and at
sT = sN,T we focus on the final-stage-local equilibrium in which player fT draws. Given sB,T
and sN,T , the final-stage-local equilibria may be characterized as:
Both draw if sT ∈ [0, sB,T ]
only follower draws if sT ∈ (sB,T , sN,T ]
neither draws if sT ∈ (sN,T , 1]
The corresponding subgame perfect final-stage local equilibrium expected payoffs for the
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leader and follower, respectively, are
pilT (D, pfT = 1|sT ) & pifT (D, plT = 1|sT ) if sT ∈ [0, sB,T ]
pilT (ND, pfT = 1|sT ) & pifT (D, plT = 0|sT ) if sT ∈ (sB,T , sN,T ]
pilT (ND, pfT = 0|sT ) & pifT (ND, plT = 0|sT ) if sT ∈ (sN,T , 1]
Periods 1 to T − 1
In moving from period T to any period t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, the procedure for calculating
the subgame perfect period-t-local equilibrium strategies and payoffs follows along the exact
same lines as in period T given the changes to the expressions pift(pft , plt |st) and pilt(plt , pft |st)
respectively. In particular, for each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} we take the period t + 1
continuation payoffs as given and then calculate pift(pft , plt |st) and pilt(plt , pft|st). Note that
in the case of t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, there are twelve possible transitions to consider:
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Outcome in t+ 1 st+1 is such that:
State Leader [lt+1] Draws |st+1
O1 st+1 = st lt Neither BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = ND
O2 st+1 = st lt ft+1 BRlt+1(D|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = D
O3 st+1 = st lt lt+1 BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = ND
O4 st+1 = st lt Both BRlt+1(D|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = D
O5 st+1 > st lt Neither BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = ND
O6 st+1 > st lt ft+1 BRlt+1(D|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = D
O7 st+1 > st lt lt+1 BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = ND
O8 st+1 > st lt Both BRlt+1(D|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = D
O9 st+1 > st ft Neither BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = ND
O10 st+1 > st ft ft+1 BRlt+1(D|st+1) = ND
& BRft+1(ND|st+1) = D
O11 st+1 > st ft lt+1 BRlt+1(ND|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = ND
O12 st+1 > st ft Both BRlt+1(D|st+1) = D
& BRft+1(D|st+1) = D
Note that although O3, O7 and O11 do not arise in equilibrium [i.e. there exists no t with
a period-t-local equilibrium in which only the leader draws], we include that here as a pos-
sibility. Also observe that in states O5-O8 it must be the case that lt draws and in states
O9-O12 it must be the case that ft draws.
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For the period-t follower we have:
pift(D, plt = 0|st) = Prob(O1|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O1
)
Prob(O2|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O2
)
+ Prob(O3|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O3
)
+ Prob(O4|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O4
)
+ Prob(O9|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pilt+1(ND, pft+1 = 0|st+1)|O5
)
Prob(O10|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pilt+1(ND, pft+1 = 1|st+1)|O6
)
+ Prob(O11|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pilt+1(D, pft+1 = 0|st+1)|O7
)
+ Prob(O12|st, D, plt = 0)E
(
pilt+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O8
)
(15)
pift(D, plt = 1|st) = Prob(O1|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O1
)
Prob(O2|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O2
)
+ Prob(O3|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O3
)
+ Prob(O4|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O4
)
+ Prob(O5|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O5
)
Prob(O6|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O6
)
+ Prob(O7|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O7
)
+ Prob(O8|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O8
)
+ Prob(O9|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pilt+1(ND, pft+1 = 0|st+1)|O5
)
Prob(O10|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pilt+1(ND, pft+1 = 1|st+1)|O6
)
+ Prob(O11|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pilt+1(D, pft+1 = 0|st+1)|O7
)
+ Prob(O12|st, D, plt = 1)E
(
pilt+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O8
)
(16)
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pift(ND, plt = 0|st) = Prob(O1|st, ND, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O1
)
Prob(O2|st, ND, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O2
)
+ Prob(O3|st, ND, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O3
)
+ Prob(O4|st, ND, plt = 0)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O4
)
(17)
pift(ND, plt = 1|st) = Prob(O1|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O1
)
Prob(O2|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O2
)
+ Prob(O3|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O3
)
+ Prob(O4|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O4
)
+ Prob(O5|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O5
)
Prob(O6|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 0|st+1)|O6
)
+ Prob(O7|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(ND, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O7
)
+ Prob(O8|st, ND, plt = 1)E
(
pift+1(D, plt+1 = 1|st+1)|O8
)
(18)
Given the expressions in equations (15)-(18) for the period-t follower and the correspond-
ing calculations for the period-t leader, the period-t-local equilibrium can be calculated by:
(i) forming the period-t version of the ‘∆’ expressions in equations (5), (6), (11), and (12),
(ii) using the period-t version of the ‘∆’ expressions to form the period t indifference condi-
tions (7) and (13) and construct each player’s period-t-local best-response correspondences
as in equations (14) and (8), and (iii), using the player’s period-t-local best-response corre-
spondences characterize the period-t-local equilibrium.
As an example, consider the case of t = T − 1. Recall the characterization of the final-
stage-local pure-strategy equilibrium:
Both draw if sT ∈ [0, sB,T ]
only follower draws if sT ∈ (sB,T , sN,T ]
neither draws if sT ∈ (sN,T , 1]
Note that in period T − 1, we know that there exists no period T equilibrium in which only
lT draws. Thus, there is no possible transition from state T − 1 to state T in the form of
outcomes O3, O7, and O11.
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If the max score at the beginning of period T−1 is sT−1, then the probabilities Prob(Oj|·),
for j = 1, . . . , 12 in equation (15) are given by:
Prob(O1|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =
F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ (sN,T , 1]0 otherwise
Prob(O2|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =
F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ (sB,T , sN,T ]0 otherwise
Prob(O3|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) = 0
Prob(O4|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =
F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ [0, sB,T ]0 otherwise
Prob(O9|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =
1− F (sN,T ) if sT−1 ∈ [0, sN,T ]1− F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ (sN,T , 1]
Prob(O10|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =

F (sN,T )− F (sB,T ) if sT−1 ∈ [0, sB,T ]
F (sN,T )− F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ (sB,T , sN,T ]
0 if sT−1 ∈ (sN,T , 1]
Prob(O11|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) = 0
Prob(O12|sT−1, D, plT−1 = 0) =
F (sB,T )− F (sT−1) if sT−1 ∈ [0, sB,T ]0 if sT−1 ∈ (sB,T , 1]
The corresponding probabilities for equations (16)-(18) follow directly. This completes
the description of the process for characterizing the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
finite horizon leaderboard-feedback innovation contest.
B Incorporating Behavioral Characteristics
We obtain predictions for risk aversion, loss aversion, and the sunk cost fallacy using the
following procedure:
• First, for a maximum score in the leader-board feedback treatment and an individual
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score in the private feedback treatment, we calculate the expected utility from drawing
or not drawing in the last period. At this stage, we incorporate the relevant behavioral
characteristic (risk aversion, loss aversion, sunk cost fallacy) into that calculation and
repeat this process for various scores in each treatment.
• We then calculate the expected utility, and the optimal decisions, in the penultimate
period for the same scores. We calculate the expected utility of drawing and not
drawing in the penultimate period through backward induction as we have solved for
the last period.
• We continue this process using backward induction. Once we have solved for the opti-
mal decisions for each score and period, we use simulations to make contest predictions.
We use the following specifications:
• Risk aversion is modeled using CRRA utility, that is, u(x) = x1−r
1−r .
• Loss aversion is modeled as an individual being reference dependent around losses.
Let TC be the total cost an agent has spent in the contest and E be the agent’s
endowment. When an individual loses the contest, her utility is given by E − λ ∗ TC,
where λ > 1. Note that an individual can never lose money when she wins the prize in
our experiment. When an individual wins the contest, her utility is given by E+V−TC,
where V is the prize value.
• The sunk cost fallacy is modeled as an individual having a preference for drawing
when she has accumulated sunk costs in the contest. An individual’s expected utility
in the last period from drawing is given by E − TC +α ∗ TC + p(V ) ∗ V , where α > 0
and p(V ) is the probability that she wins the contest.
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Figure B1: Effect of Risk Aversion on Period T Local Best Responses for Leader-
board Feedback
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Figure B2: Effect of Risk Aversion on Period T Local Best Responses for Private
Feedback
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C Experimental Instructions
C.1 Introduction
Welcome and thank you for participating! Today’s experiment will last about 60 minutes.
Everyone will earn at least $5. If you follow the instructions carefully, you might earn even
more money. This money will be paid at the end of the experiment in private and in cash.
It is important that during the experiment you remain silent. If you have a question or
need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, but do not speak - and an experiment
administrator will come to you, and you may then whisper your question. In addition, please
turn off your cell phones and put them away during the experiment. Anybody that violates
these rules will be asked to leave.
In this experiment you will face 27 tasks in which you will take the role of an entrepreneur.
Prior to each task, you will be provided with the information regarding the task. At the end
of the experiment, two of the tasks will be chosen randomly to determine your actual money
earnings. Thus, your decisions in one task will not affect your earnings in any other task. In
addition, at the end of the 27 tasks, you will be asked to fill out several questionnaires.
Next, you will be provided detailed information pertaining to Task #1-8 of the experi-
ment. Before starting with the actual tasks, you will face one practice task. Your compen-
sation for the experiment will not depend on the practice task
C.2 Tasks #1–8: Description
In Tasks #1–8 of the experiment, you will be given an endowment of $10 and choose whether
to develop up to 10 technologies at a cost of $1 per technology. The quality of each technology
is uncertain and will be determined randomly using the probability distribution to the right.
However, only the best technology can be brought to the market and yield revenue.
The decisions whether to develop a technology will be made sequentially. In particular,
you will first decide whether to develop technology #1. If you decide to do so, you will incur
a cost of $1 and observe the quality of technology #1. Next, you will decide whether to
develop technology #2. If so, you will incur a cost of $1. And so on. Each new technology
will be obtained using an independent draw from the distribution to the right. That is,
quality of technology #2 does not depend on technology #1, quality of technology #3 does
not depend on technology #2, etc. At each decision, you will be provided with the summary
information in the graphical and text forms.
For example, suppose you have developed 4 technologies. Each of them will be marked
on the graph with a line. At the time of each decision, you will be provided with the proba-
bility that a new technology will be better (or worse) than the best known technology. For
example, suppose you are deciding whether to develop technology #5, then the probability
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that technology #5 will be better than the best known technology is shaded in green, and
is equal to 36%. The probability that technology #5 will be worse than the best known
technology is shaded in red, and is equal to 64%.
For each task, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room. Each
of you will simultaneously and independently decide whether to develop up to 10 technologies
(one technology at a time). At the time of each decision you will not know the technology
that has the best quality among all of the technologies developed so far (either by you or by
the participant that you are matched with). After all of the decisions have been made, the
best technology developed in during the task (either by you or by the participant that you
are matched with) will be revealed. The best technology will be adopted by the market and
yield $10 revenue.
At this time you can get some experience of drawing from the distribution. You can
click ‘Draw’ to draw a random number from the distribution. You can also click ‘Reset’
to clear all the draws. Reminder, each draw is independent from all other draws. Note,
that although the diagram shows domain to be [0,50], the domain is unbounded and there
is a small chance (less than a quarter of one percent) that a draw from the distribution will
exceed 50. When you are done drawing random numbers from the distribution, please click
‘Continue to Practice Task’.
Figure C1: Screenshots of Distribution Presented in Instructions
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C.3 Tasks #1–8: Practice Task
Figure C2: Screenshots of the Practice Task
37
D Additional Tables and Figures
Figure D1: Screenshots of the Risk Aversion Elicitation Task
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Figure D2: Screenshots of the Loss Aversion Elicitation Task
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Figure D3: Screenshots of the Sunk Cost Fallacy Elicitation Task
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Figure D4: Screenshots of the Individual Search Task
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Table D1: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var.: Pooled Private Leaderboard
Draw Decision All Leader Follower All Leader Follower
L-Board -0.70*** — — — — — —
(0.20) — — — — — —
Priv. x Score -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.18*** — — —
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) — — —
L-Board x MaxScore -0.11*** — — — -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.11***
(0.01) — — — (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Period -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.24*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Risk Aversion -1.10∗∗ -1.61** -1.71 -1.36* -0.79* -0.64 -0.20
(0.50) (0.76) (1.26) (0.70) (0.45) (0.93) (0.91)
Loss Aversion -0.13 0.02 1.26 -0.74 -0.22 -1.33 0.07
(0.63) (0.78) (1.11) (0.65) (0.66) (1.11) (0.96)
Sunk Cost Fallacy 0.11 0.29 -0.93 0.41 -0.15 -0.62 0.01
(0.63) (0.97) (0.85) (1.00) (0.51) (0.87) (0.96)
Factor 1 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.31***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12)
Factor 2 — — — — — — —
— — — — — — —
Factor 3 0.02 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.05 -0.23 0.12
(0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14)
Factor 4 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.15
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.18)
Factor 5 0.16 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.20**
(0.10) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08)
Factor 6 0.18** 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.20** 0.16 0.08
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.14)
Factor 7 -0.09 -0.17 -0.22 -0.17 -0.04 -0.06 -0.22
(0.11) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18) (0.18)
Factor 8 -0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 -0.14
(0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16) (0.15)
Factor 9 -0.08 -0.08 -0.19 0.02 -0.11 0.04 -0.44**
(0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.22) (0.22)
Constant 1.69*** 1.83** 4.26*** 1.17 1.17** 2.17*** 1.99***
(0.57) (0.81) (0.77) (0.86) (0.51) (0.74) (0.76)
Observations 15,360 7,680 3,451 3,451 7,680 3,411 3,411
Notes: The regression pools the data from the individual search tasks, the private-
feedback treatment, and the leaderboard-feedback treatment. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Figure D5: Decision to Draw in the Leaderboard-Feedback Treatment
Notes: This figure displays two sets of graphs. The first set of graphs display logistic
regressions of the decision to draw in the private-feedback treatment for periods 3, 4, 5,
7, 8, and 9. The second set of graphs display logistic regressions of the leader’s decision
(blue) to draw and the follower’s decision (red) to draw in the leaderboard-feedback
treatment for periods 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9.
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Table D2: Contest Results
Priv. Draws LB Draws Priv. Innovation LB Innovation
Session 1 6.53 7.16 24.02 19.20
Session 2 7.78 8.00 21.81 23.46
Session 3 8.97 7.89 19.34 23.16
Session 4 7.28 6.22 22.44 19.24
Session 5 7.41 7.25 21.06 20.84
Session 6 7.22 7.50 20.40 21.48
Session 7 9.19 7.09 26.54 19.82
Session 8 8.59 6.69 24.82 21.21
Session 9 9.28 7.72 21.62 23.91
Session 10 10.16 9.75 22.92 20.54
Session 11 9.03 7.00 24.18 21.58
Session 12 10.59 8.28 25.33 23.18
Notes: Priv. Draws refers to the mean number of draws in a contest in a session in
the pravate-feedback treatment. LB Draws refers to the mean number of draws in a
contest in a session in the leaderboard-feedback treatment. Priv. Innovation refers to
the mean value of the winning innovation in a session in the pravate-feedback treatment.
LB Innovation refers to the mean value of the winning innovation in a session in the
leaderboard-feedback treatment.
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Figure D6: Decision to Draw in the Simulated Leaderboard-Feedback Contests
Notes: These graphs display logistic regressions of the leader’s decision (blue) to draw
and the follower’s decision (red) to draw in the simulated leaderboard-feedback treatment
contests for periods 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
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Figure D7: Decision to Draw in the Simulated Private-Feedback Contests
Notes: The first set of graphs display logistic regressions of the decision to draw in the
simulated pravate-feedback treatment contests for periods 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
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Table D3: Individual Regression Results
(1) (2)
Dep. Var.: Individual Individual
Draw Decision
Individual Score -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Period -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.02)
Risk Aversion -2.70∗∗ -2.72***
(1.17) (1.00)
Loss Aversion -0.80 -0.84
(1.00) (1.02)
Sunk Cost Fallacy -0.13 -0.10
(0.59) (0.72)
Grit/Factor 1 -0.57** -0.08
(0.23) (0.14)
Competitiveness/Factor 2 0.05 —
(0.43) —
Achievement Striving/Factor 3 0.02 0.27**
(0.66) (0.11)
Extraversion/Factor 4 0.17 0.06
(0.11) (0.12)
Agreeableness/Factor 5 0.27 0.19**
(0.24) (0.08)
Neuroticism/Factor 6 -0.18 -0.10
(0.23) (0.12)
Openness/Factor 7 0.05 -0.06
(0.18) (0.19)
Conscientiousness/Factor 8 0.09 -0.19**
(0.24) (0.08)
Factor 9 — 0.07
— (0.22)
Constant -1.35 -1.48**
(0.99) (0.67)
Observations 7,680 7,680
Notes: The regression pools the data from the individual search tasks, the pravate-
feedback treatment, and the leaderboard-feedback treatment. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table D4: Demographics Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var.: Pooled Private Leaderoard
Draw Decision All Leader Follower All Leader Follower
L-Board -0.70*** — — — — — —
(0.20) — — — — — —
Priv. x Score -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.18*** — — —
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) — — —
L-Board x MaxScore -0.11*** — — — -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.11***
(0.01) — — — (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Period -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.24*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Risk Aversion -0.74∗∗ -1.15** -1.64** -0.95 -0.60 -0.22 -0.58
(0.35) (0.47) (0.80) (0.61) (0.38) (1.05) (0.65)
Loss Aversion -0.72 -0.67 0.52 -1.01* -0.79 -1.32 -1.00
(0.50) (0.59) (0.72) (0.56) (0.62) (1.06) (0.91)
Sunk Cost Fallacy 0.40 0.66 -0.47 0.77 0.07 -0.29 0.51
(0.49) (0.75) (0.67) (0.81) (0.32) (0.80) (0.62)
Gender -0.15 -0.17 -0.11 -0.03 -0.14 -0.36 0.33
(0.14) (0.20) (0.25) (0.22) (0.17) (0.30) (0.28)
Age -0.11*** -0.18** -0.23*** -0.16** -0.07 -0.04 -0.22
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 3.09*** 3.93** 7.35*** 2.78 2.05** 3.56 4.13*
(0.96) (1.75) (1.48) (1.83) (0.85) (2.25) (2.22)
Observations 15,360 7,680 3,451 3,451 7,680 3,411 3,411
Notes: The regressions analyze how demographics influence the decision to draw. Gender
is a dummy variable for male. There are multiple race dummy variables, major dummy
variables, school year dummy variables, and high school location dummy variables that
are in these regressions, but not included in the tables. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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